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What Maisie Knew: Nineteenth-Century Selfhood in the Mind of the 
Child 
By Roisín Laing, Durham University  
  
     Just one month before the first issue of Henry James’s What 
Maisie Knew (1897) appeared in the New Review, American 
psychologist G. Stanley Hall co-authored an innovative work on a 
seemingly esoteric subject: “A Study of Dolls” (1896) presents 
scrupulously detailed statistical data on childhood doll-play, 
based on responses to a questionnaire distributed to over eight 
hundred parents and teachers.1 Fellow psychologist James Sully 
shared Hall’s interest in dolls: in 1898, he contributed an 
essay called “Dollatry” to the Contemporary Review and thereby 
publicized, to a wider audience than Hall and Ellis had reached, 
the unconventional methodology sometimes deployed in the name of 
psychological research. 
     Sully’s objective in publishing his research was to justify 
this methodology, and thus to confer credibility on the newly 
emerging discipline of Child Study, which he and Hall were 
pioneering in Britain and in America respectively.2 When Sully 
argues that “if dolls could tell us what they are supposed, as 
confidants and confessors, to hear from the lips of their small 
devotees, they might throw more light on the nature of “the 
child’s mind” than all the psychologists,” he validates the 
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study of doll-play as one method through which psychologists 
might access the mind of the child (58).  
     The very title of What Maisie Knew seems, as Adrian Poole 
observes, “to make a promise” that it will provide similar 
access to the child’s mind (vii). However, in its preface, James 
observes that “[s]mall children have many more perceptions than 
they have terms to translate them; their vision is at any moment 
much richer, their apprehension even constantly stronger, than 
their prompt, their at all producible vocabulary” and thus 
isolates what becomes the central representational and thematic 
problem of the text, and of the project it shares with 
contemporary Child Study (WMK 294). 
     For Glenn Clifton, this prefatory remark anticipates the 
novel’s thematic and stylistic preoccupation with language and 
with the disjunction between language and experience that is so 
central to What Maisie Knew. However, Clifton’s analysis is 
inattentive to the significance of the “small children” to whom 
James refers. James’s own study of childhood mental experience 
follows explorations of the same subject by many major 
nineteenth-century authors and coincides both with the earliest 
years of the first Golden Age of children’s literature and with 
the emergence of Child Study in work by Hall, Sully, and many 
others.3 By specifying that “small children” are his subject, 
James plainly situates What Maisie Knew within a discourse about 
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childhood that had become increasingly prominent in the final 
decades of the nineteenth century. 
     In the context of this burgeoning interest in the mind of 
the child, James’s statement is not only about language in 
itself; it must be about language for the child. It is 
particularly the child’s vision that language cannot 
“translate.” It is specifically what Maisie knows that is beyond 
what she has the terms to express. What Maisie Knew explores the 
disjunction between language and experience, as Clifton 
suggests, but it does so because it is a literary study of the 
child.  
     Such studies of childhood as James’s What Maisie Knew and 
Sully’s or Hall’s psychological Child Study proliferated in 
response to a specific cultural and intellectual crisis. Deborah 
J. Coon has argued that “[t]he soul had provided the dominant 
explanation for human thought and behaviour since before the 
Christian era,” but that in the aftermath of Charles Darwin’s 
revolutionary contribution to natural sciences “[t]here was 
considerable pressure to abandon the soul as an explanatory 
mechanism” (85, 86). Selfhood became a necessary alternative to 
the soul and, as Carolyn Steedman claims, the clearest 
expression of “[this] interiorised self” was embodied in the 
idea of childhood in the period (5). The child, therefore, 
became what James Kincaid has described as a “repository” for 
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selfhood as a newly emergent adult need in the late nineteenth 
century (78).  
     Childhood is a particularly apt forum for the exploration 
of selfhood because of the innocence it is supposed to embody. 
If selfhood as a substitute for the soul is represented by what 
Jacques Lacan calls the “Ideal-I,” it is always “more 
constituent that constituted,” because “the dialectical 
syntheses by which [the subject] must resolve as I his 
discordance with his own reality” is only ever partially 
successful: selfhood is a constituent part of a never-quite 
constituted self (2). By identifying language--“I”--as that 
which inhibits this constituted self Lacan suggests that the 
child might experience such an “Ideal” self because she is 
outside language. As Kevin Ohi argues, however, it is not the 
child herself, but the idea of innocence she represents, that 
“serves to contain difference internal to language and 
subjectivity” (7). That disjunction between language and 
experience described by Clifton is, in the late nineteenth 
century, often a more specific disjunction between language and 
selfhood, and one that the innocent child was imagined to 
resolve.  
     This is implicit in the findings of much psychological 
Child Study: “A Study of Dolls,” for example, finds a child-mind 
that is innocent in a specific and contextually significant way. 
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Many responses to Hall and Ellis’s survey describe 
“[d]iscussions with sceptical brothers, who assert that the doll 
is nothing but wood, rubber, wax, etc.”; these assertions “are 
often met with a resentment as keen as that vented . . . upon 
those who assert cerebral, automatic or necessitarian theories 
of the soul” (136). The “cerebral” “theories of the soul” 
referred to are those theories that, substantiated most 
influentially by Darwin, in fact questioned the very existence 
of the soul. That word, “dollatry,” which Sully coined in his 
study, is a more succinct articulation of the observations made 
by Hall and Ellis: the now-idolatrous belief in the soul is 
resurrected, in newly validated form, in the mind of the child.  
     This association of the child’s belief with religious 
belief suggests that Hall, Ellis, and Sully, among many others, 
conducted their research in response to the loss of the soul in 
the post-Darwin period. The breadth and intensity of interest in 
childhood in the final decades of the nineteenth century 
suggests that children represented an increasingly necessary 
complement to the purely scientific approach that had brought 
about this loss. Through the child-mind (as expressed in, for 
example, her dollatry), the self might be a sufficient 
substitute for the outdated Christian soul. 
     As Lynn Wardley has argued, What Maisie Knew is therefore 
‘typical of its moment’ in identifying childhood as a 
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particularly significant period for a form of ‘self-
understanding’ which was consistent with nineteenth-century 
theories of evolution (250-1).4 Situating James’s novel in the 
context of contemporaneous Child Study indicates that what 
Maisie knows is in fact this innocent knowledge of self, which 
was the project of Child Study--and of countless studies of 
childhood in literature and in science--to access. Like the 
child in Lacan’s “Mirror-Stage,” Maisie’s knowledge is “richer” 
than language and therefore serves the function of innocence Ohi 
describes: it transcends the difference internal to language and 
therefore contains the difference otherwise internal to 
selfhood. As far as Maisie’s knowledge is beyond her language, 
that knowledge can, paradoxically, be synonymous with her 
innocence. In its late nineteenth-century context, Maisie’s 
innocent knowledge is essentially a knowledge of self that is 
outside language.  
     This is not to suggest that the question of Maisie’s 
innocence is not, also, the question of the extent of her 
knowledge of sex. Indeed, Kerry Robinson has suggested that the 
very idea of innocence seems to contain “a denial of children’s 
sexuality” (49). However, while innocence might contain such a 
denial, it is not necessarily limited to or even defined by 
this: indeed, one of the earliest assertions of children’s 
sexuality is predicated on an idea of innocence and one that is, 
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moreover, consistent with the particular form of innocence 
attributed to Maisie and to her counter-part subjects in 
scientific Child Study. Sigmund Freud’s “Infantile Sexuality” 
(1905) attributes adult forgetfulness of childhood sexuality to 
the child’s innocence, not of that sexuality but of language.  
     Freud claims that “there is no period at which the capacity 
for receiving and reproducing impressions is greater than 
precisely during the years of childhood” (41). The observation 
that “of all this we, when we are grown up, have no knowledge of 
our own” is a reference to the phenomenon of childhood amnesia 
(41). Although Freud focuses specifically on the forgetfulness 
of sexual “impressions,” childhood amnesia operates on all 
experiences up to a certain age, and as Charles Fernyhough has 
noted, “it is unlikely to be a coincidence that the end of 
childhood amnesia corresponds to the period in which small 
children become thoroughly verbal beings” (75). The centrality 
of infantile amnesia to Freud’s analysis of infantile sexuality 
therefore associates the loss of the child’s particularly vivid 
capacity for vision--the loss of innocence--not with the onset 
of sexuality but with the onset of language.  
     Therefore, when James notes that Maisie “would have to be 
saved,” he refers in part to the pragmatic necessity that Maisie 
be removed from what Peter Coveney describes as the “squalid, 
vulgar, negative” adult society represented in the novel (199). 
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The subsequent remark that she might also save others by “sowing 
on barren strands, through the mere fact of presence, the seed 
of the moral life” is the more essential concern of the novel 
(WMK 292). Insofar as it is innocent of language, Maisie’s 
vision represents a form of selfhood that might “save” the 
adults around her. The “barren strands” James refers to denote 
both what Peter Coveney calls the “squalid, vulgar, negative” 
adult society represented in the text, and the soulless world in 
which the child’s innocence--Maisie’s vision--might represent 
the salvation of selfhood (Coveney 199).  
     Of course, the squalor that surrounds Maisie and the 
question of whether she is, ultimately, saved from it point to 
the risk, if not the impossibility, of accessing the child’s 
innocent knowledge. The promise to reveal what Maisie knew is 
the promise to provide insight into the knowledge of self for 
which Maisie is the repository. However, surrounded by moral and 
linguistic squalor, that innocent knowledge is always 
potentially, if not already, corrupted. What Maisie Knew 
therefore problematizes the project of Child Study, the culture 
of studying childhood, and the promise of its own title by 
interrogating the attempt to access the child’s innocent, 
inarticulable, knowledge of self.  
     Because it is paradoxically innocent, Maisie’s knowledge is 
resistant, if not antithetical, to the means by which the 
9 
 
author--and the psychologist--might access and represent it. To 
need the child is to risk contaminating the very knowledge for 
which she is needed. The attempt to access selfhood in the 
child’s mind therefore presents a major difficulty in What 
Maisie Knew: an idea of innocence and the effect of adult need 
on that innocence are the central thematic concerns of the 
novel, which thus thematizes the conflict underlying the broader 
culture of child-study in the late nineteenth century.5 
     This conflict is represented from the opening pages in the 
dispute between Maisie’s parents and, eventually, step-parents. 
As John McCloskey observes, Maisie’s divorced parents argue over 
her because her “physical presence is a symbol of external 
propriety” (490). Adults need Maisie, initially, as a pretext 
for their otherwise prohibited relationships. Accordingly, 
Maisie’s first governess, Miss Overmore, insists that “a lady 
couldn’t stay with a gentleman . . . without some awfully proper 
reason” (WMK 25). When Maisie asks “what reason is proper?,” 
Beale’s response, “a long-legged stick of a tomboy: there’s none 
so good as that,” indicates that Maisie is in her father’s house 
because her presence makes Miss Overmore’s residence there 
“proper.” Likewise, later, it is only “in connection with 
herself” that “the pleasant possibility . . . of a relation . . 
. between [the second] Mrs Beale and Sir Claude” can arise, and, 
again, only her presence that lends the arrangement proposed by 
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this couple, of a “little household we three should make,” its 
(superficial) propriety (46, 244). 
     As the scandalized gossips ventriloquized in the opening 
chapter suggest, this is all “very shocking.” Adult need 
consistently exposes Maisie to morally problematic knowledge.6 
The possible consequences of this exposure have generated some 
remarkably polarized analyses of the novel.7 Whatever the extent 
of Maisie’s adult knowledge at the end of the novel, however, 
her exposure to such knowledge accounts for many uncomfortable, 
even disturbing, moments throughout. The unsettling passage that 
describes Maisie’s game with her doll, Lisette, is one of the 
first of such moments. Maisie gradually “understood more” about 
the laughter of her mother’s friends, but her imitative shrieks 
of laughter are uncomfortably incongruous with the childish 
doll-play through which she comes to this understanding (26). 
Her demonstrably “producible” knowledge at this point is 
essentially, if at this moment only imitatively, adult: Maisie 
is “convulsed” by the innocence she is supposed to represent 
(WMK 294; 26).  
     The concern James here represents, that the adult’s need 
might corrupt that which is needed, is equally evident in Child 
Study. The possibility that the child is performing for, rather 
than being illuminated by, the adult observer, is raised when 
Sully takes issue with one of Hall’s claims: the claim cannot be 
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“conclusive,” because the data on which it is based suggest, to 
Sully, not the true feelings of the child in question but a 
“priggish ‘contrariness,’ by no means uncommon among children” 
(60). Hall himself had already published an extensive study, the 
title of which indicates his similar concerns: in “Children’s 
Lies” (1890), he observes that “[t]he loves of showing off and 
of seeming big, to attract attention or to win admiration, 
sometimes leads children to assume false characters” (67). In 
his claim that “[a] few children, especially girls, are 
honeycombed with morbid self-consciousness . . . and seem to 
have no natural character of their own,” Hall raises the 
possibility that, by making the child self-conscious, adult 
questions might obscure what they are intended to illuminate 
(67). His exasperation at this possibility is, like Sully’s, 
palpable. 
     Maeve Pearson suggests that Maisie dramatized the “inherent 
split . . . between a performed ideal and a more complex and 
inaccessible interior selfhood” (113). In doing so, Maisie 
dramatizes one major difficulty of Child Study. The performed 
and dissonantly adult knowledge that Maisie displays in her game 
with Lisette, and that the children Sully and Hall display in 
their “priggish contrariness” and “morbid self-consciousness,” 
indicate a corruption of innocence by adult need. This performed 
knowledge is irreconcilable with the inaccessible, unproducible 
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knowledge--the knowledge of self--that, as children, they are 
imagined to represent. When Maisie offers a “performed ideal,” 
she embodies the effect of scrutiny on the idea of childhood in 
the period: performing in response to this scrutiny, children 
not only obscure but actually threaten the innocent knowledge 
that is the true objective of literary and scientific child-
study.  
     If its thematic concern with the effect of adult need on 
Maisie’s innocence engages with the difficulty of its potential 
corruption encountered by practitioners of Child Study, the 
stylistic challenge of What Maisie Knew engages with the more 
fundamental difficulty of its representation. James presents 
Maisie’s knowledge as by definition inarticulable and thus 
points to the corollary of that same idea of innocent childhood 
knowledge that is promulgated in Child Study: specifically, 
James represents the stalemate such a concept presents for 
attempts, literary or scientific, to access the child’s 
knowledge.  
     According to James Gargano, James’s use of “a central 
intelligence not altogether capable . . . of assessing and 
conceptualising the value of her experiences” necessitates “the 
wealth of authorial explanation” that characterizes What Maisie 
Knew (35). However, the moment when Maisie meets her mother’s 
new partner, the Captain (or “the Count,” as Sir Claude 
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misleadingly refers to him), for the first time indicates that 
authorial explanations of Maisie’s knowledge are insufficient at 
best.8 The narrator describes what Maisie observes as her mother 
approaches her and Sir Claude:  
leaving the Count apparently to come round more circuitously--an 
outflanking movement, if Maisie had but known--[Ida] resumed the 
onset. . . . “What are you doing with my daughter?” she demanded 
of her husband; in spite of the indignant tone of which Maisie 
had a greater sense than ever in her life before of not being 
personally noticed. (106-07)  
The reader cannot fail to recognize that Maisie is here used as 
a pretext for a confrontation between Ida and Sir Claude. 
However, the narrator’s wish that “Maisie had but known” 
emphasizes that the reader’s understanding of the scene is 
facilitated not by Maisie’s assessment of it, but by the 
narrator’s. More particularly, it is the narrator’s metaphorical 
description of the scene in terms of a battle--that is, his 
language--that enables the reader’s understanding of the scene.  
     For many critics the articulate, authoritative narrative 
voice exemplified in this passage offers a reliable transmission 
of Maisie’s experience.9 Indeed, James insists that his “own 
commentary,” which “constantly attends and amplifies” Maisie’s 
more limited “terms,” is “required whenever those aspects about 
her and those parts of her experience that she understands 
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darken off into others that she rather tormentedly misses” (WMK 
294-95, emphases mine). According to this, Maisie’s presence 
necessitates and thus validates the capacity of the narrator to 
articulate, and even augment, the child’s mind. In this 
analysis, the narrator functions as what Mikhail Bakhtin 
describes as “an extra-artistic medium” and his “discourse” as 
“an artistically neutral means of communication”: language is a 
neutral means through which an impartial narrator can articulate 
what Maisie knows (206). If language is this “extra-artistic 
medium,” What Maisie Knew can fulfil the promise of its title, 
because its author has resolved the extraordinary technical 
challenge of representing the mind of a child by exhibiting, in 
language, knowledge that exists outside language.  
     Of course, What Maisie Knew does not do this. The conflict 
between Maisie’s experience and the narrator’s language is 
repeatedly and explicitly expressed by the narrator throughout. 
Far from being resolved, the problem of representing the meaning 
of Maisie’s experience exemplifies that more fundamental 
conflict identified by Clifton between experience and language 
in general. Indeed, immediately after Ida’s “onset,” and the 
seeming clarity that that metaphor constructs for the scene, 
Maisie and the Captain have an exchange, the subject of which is 
the inadequacy of language to encompass either’s experience. The 
Captain attempts to explain his feelings for Ida to Maisie; the 
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explanation culminates in “a small sigh that mourned the limits 
of the speakable”; Maisie “found herself, in the intensity of 
her response, throbbing with a joy still less utterable than the 
essence of the Captain’s admiration” (WMK 112-13). This is, of 
course, not unusual for Maisie. As the narrator observes, she 
“had ever . . . in her mind fewer names than conceptions” (150, 
emphasis mine). The Captain’s momentary encounter with the 
limits of the speakable therefore replicates the defining 
condition of Maisie’s mind. 
     The primary effect of this passage is to suggest experience 
that, in “intensity,” is beyond language. This must undermine 
Gargano’s claim that Maisie cannot conceptualise her experience 
because she cannot articulate it, and must therefore also 
question the view that the narrator is a neutral medium for the 
communication of Maisie’s mind (Gargano 35). The narrator, in 
fact, makes it insistently clear that Maisie’s perceptions 
exceed not only her own language but his language, as, for 
example, when he remarks that “the fullest expression we may 
give to Sir Claude’s conduct is a poor and pale copy of the 
picture it presented to his young friend” (149). The narrator’s 
“poor and pale” copy of her knowledge here indicates that what 
Maisie knows is beyond what any vocabulary might communicate. 
Whatever knowledge the child’s mind contains is by definition 
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unproducible, not only by Maisie herself but also by the 
narrator.  
     In thus presenting the child’s mind as beyond language, 
What Maisie Knew engages with the idea of childhood expressed in 
contemporaneous Child Study. Though nineteenth-century child 
psychologists like Sully and Hall do not focus particularly on 
child sexuality, their work anticipates Freud’s suggestion that 
“determining” visions and impressions are received in childhood 
and forgotten in adulthood (41). Language, moreover, is 
intrinsic both to childhood vision and to adult forgetfulness of 
it: the child’s knowledge is innocent only because, and as long 
as, it is inarticulable. These works not only reiterate the idea 
in What Maisie Knew of the child’s unproducible knowledge. They 
also point to the contextual significance of this idea. Because 
it is both knowledgeable and unproducible, the child-mind 
actually resolves an adult disjunction between language and 
selfhood. 
     In, for example, “Children’s Lies,” Hall claims that “[t]he 
fancy of some children is almost visualisation” (66). This 
promptly escalates into the suggestion that, for children, 
“[r]every [. . .] materialises all wishes.” According to this, 
language and reality unify in the child’s mind. To suggest that 
“Mr Gradgrind would war upon [this] as inimical to scientific 
veracity” is to suggest that science–-and therefore Hall himself 
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by association–-is limited by its inability to share the child’s 
unscientific perception (66-67).10  
     Sully’s Studies of Childhood (1895) likewise represents the 
disjunction between language and reality as an adult experience 
that is particularly exposed by efforts to access the child mind 
and represents the child as the embodied resolution of that 
disjunction. Sully suggests that, in childhood, “spoken words as 
sounds for the ear have in themselves something of the immediate 
objective reality of all sense-impressions” (55). For children, 
language not only refers to a universally recognized, “objective 
reality” but, consequently, “to name a thing is in a sense to 
make it present” (55).  
     Both Hall and Sully moreover make it clear that it is 
specifically the child who has a vision of “immediate objective 
reality” through language. When Hall suggests that “[w]e might 
almost say of children at least [. . .] that all their life is 
imagination,” he claims that what children imagine to be true 
actually is true, if only to children themselves (67, emphasis 
mine). Similarly, Sully claims that the adult’s explanations of 
language “rudely breaks the spell of the illusion, calling off 
the attention from the vision [the child] sees in the word-
crystal . . . to the cold lifeless crystal itself” (56). In 
these studies of the child’s mind, what William Wordsworth calls 
the “meddling intellect,” is that of the psychologist, who “mis-
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shapes the beauteous forms” (61) of things as they appear, by 
what Sully calls “a secret-child art,” in the child’s innocent 
vision (56). According to Sully and Hall, children in general 
not only insist on the unity of language and reality; they 
actually have the capacity to make present that reality in 
language. 
     Maisie epitomizes the possible unity of language and 
experience–-of language and self–-that is implicit in such 
studies of the child mind. For Sheila Teahan, the narrator’s 
repeated intrusions in the first person in the second half of 
What Maisie Knew demonstrate that, “though the narrator claims 
merely to report what Maisie knows, he is deeply implicated in 
the construction of that knowledge” (220). These moments make 
the reader aware of the narrator’s active role in the 
construction, in language, of Maisie’s mind, and this puts under 
particular strain the illusion of unity between the narrator’s 
language and that mind.11 I suggest that by thus so openly 
failing to sustain the illusion that he articulates Maisie’s 
mind the narrator insists that Maisie herself has the capacity 
for a vision that makes present the reality of selfhood 
misshapen by his language.  
     The narrator’s first intrusion in the first person 
coincides with a comic moment of miscommunication between Mrs. 
Wix and Maisie: Mrs. Wix’s claim that Sir Claude “leans on me,” 
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gives Maisie “the impression of a support literally supplied by 
her person” (73). This “glimpse of a misconception led [Mrs. 
Wix] to be explicit”: “the life she wanted him to take right 
hold of was the public: ‘she,’ I hasten to add, was, in this 
connection, not the mistress of his fate, but only Mrs. Wix 
herself” (73, emphasis mine). By intruding as “I” at this point, 
and several times afterwards, the narrator draws attention to 
himself and therefore to Maisie’s mind as a construction in his 
language. Moreover, of course, he intrudes to explain. His own 
words, like Mrs. Wix’s, obscure rather than clarify the 
relationship between Mrs. Wix and Sir Claude which they try to 
describe.  
     The obscurity within the text of Mrs. Wix’s words leads to 
Maisie’s mis-interpretation. As Kenny Marotta has suggested, 
this mis-interpretation demonstrates that Maisie “seeks, to the 
consternation of her elders, to connect their words to literal 
realities” (497). The obscurity of the text, which the narrator 
interrupts in an attempt to clarify, therefore coincides with 
Maisie’s insistence, at this moment, on the unity of language 
with “literal reality.” The text thus questions the validity of 
the belief that it simultaneously suggests Maisie embodies. 
Maisie’s belief in the unity of language and reality is, itself, 
what exposes Mrs. Wix’s failure to validate that belief and, 
seemingly, what triggers the narrator’s admission of his own, 
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equivalent, failure. Maisie’s belief becomes the very obstacle 
inhibiting Mrs. Wix’s, the narrator’s, and the reader’s access 
to that belief.  
     Those readers who accept the narrator’s words as what 
Bakhtin calls the “artistically neutral” means to communicate 
Maisie’s mind therefore replicate Maisie’s erroneous assumption 
about the relationship between Mrs Wix’s words and the reality 
to which they supposedly refer.  That Maisie’s misconception 
coincides with the first intrusion of the narrator in the first-
person seems, therefore, to insist that the narrator’s words are 
not to be viewed as the authoritative articulation of the 
child’s mind and therefore that the text should not be read in 
the way that Maisie reads Mrs. Wix’s words. Mrs. Wix’s obscurity 
and the narrator’s intrusion are not the accidental self-defeat 
of a writer who has attempted to advocate Maisie’s--mistaken--
approach to language. They are, rather, consistent with a 
broader cultural understanding, evident in Child Study as in 
What Maisie Knew, of language and selfhood as unified only in 
the mind of the child. Maisie’s mind both represents the 
potential unity of language with reality and exposes their 
disunity in the adult. The novel insists that only through the 
child’s mind is language what Bakhtin calls an “extra-artistic 
medium,” one that connects transparently with, rather than 
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modifying or corrupting, the literal realities to which it 
refers.  
     It is therefore telling that, immediately subsequent to 
that first intrusion, the narrator remarks that “these days 
brought on a high quickening of Maisie’s direct perceptions, of 
her gratified sense of arriving by herself at conclusions” (WMK 
75). Maisie’s hope that there is an objective reality beyond 
language both coincides with the narrator’s inability to share 
her hope and precedes his admission that Maisie’s perception of 
that reality is becoming more conclusive. Teahan suggests that 
the illusion that we are reading a narrative of Maisie’s 
consciousness breaks down toward the end of the novel and with 
it “the representational strategy of the central consciousness” 
(225). What Maisie is coming “by herself” to know is the 
objective reality that, according to Sully, children can make 
present through language: it is, of course, only by being 
inarticulable that Maisie’s perceptions can be thus imagined. If 
Sully and Hall exemplify the prevalence of Maisie’s hope in the 
unity of language and reality, they also indicate that, at the 
turn of the twentieth century, it was the child whose imagined 
vision validated this hope. The breakdown of James’s 
representational strategy is therefore the necessary corollary 
to the image of the child as the embodiment of knowledge in 
which language and reality are unified.12 
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     Maisie’s knowledge of the unity of language and reality 
speaks to the contemporary need for selfhood to which this 
fascination with childhood responded. Toward the end of the 
novel, Mrs. Wix asks Maisie “Haven’t you really and truly any 
moral sense?” (205). As many critics have noted, the answer to 
this question has implications beyond the narrow conventionality 
that is Mrs. Wix’s morality. Maisie’s answer, which the narrator 
suggests “was vague even to imbecility,” is omitted from the 
narrative itself. Maisie’s moral sense is seemingly 
characterized by a deficiency and vagueness that are necessarily 
replicated by the narrator.  
     However, Maisie only “began . . . with scarcely knowing 
what [a moral sense] was” (emphasis mine). It quickly “proved 
something that, with scarce an outward sign . . . she could . . 
. strike up a sort of acquaintance with.” The implication that 
this “sort of acquaintance” is insignificant is belied by the 
narrator’s subsequent observation that “[n]othing more 
remarkable had taken place . . . no phenomenon of perception 
more inscrutable by our rough method, than her vision, the rest 
of that Boulogne day, of the manner in which she figured” (206). 
While the reader attempts, through this difficult and vague 
sentence, to solve the riddle of Maisie’s moral sense, Maisie 
herself attains “remarkable” vision of that moral sense. Because 
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it is inarticulable by the narrator, it is inaccessible to the 
reader. 
     The debate over how much sexual knowledge Maisie has at the 
end of the novel is, therefore, surely, irresolvable, but it is 
also misguided. Mrs. Wix’s question is less about Maisie’s 
sexual innocence and more about that innocent sense of self that 
might, to return to Ohi, “contain difference internal to 
language and subjectivity” (7). Lacan’s analysis of the pre-
lingual child’s interaction with his image in the mirror 
suggests that, as an instance of non-lingual self-perception, 
the I here is consistent with the child-self because it evades 
the asymptotic “coming-into-being of the subject,” that emerges 
from that discordance between “I” and “his own reality,” between 
language and the adult subject (2). If, in her remarkable vision 
of “the manner in which she figured,” Maisie similarly 
demonstrates a non-lingual “coming-into-being,” she likewise 
evades the asymptotic tension between the I of language and the 
self of her own reality. 
     Maisie’s innocent knowledge is, therefore, of the 
“objective reality” of the self. The conclusion toward which the 
text moves is therefore the moment in which she comes to see 
herself clearly. The narrator states that “[s]omehow, now that 
it was there, the great moment was not so bad. What helped the 
child was that she knew what she wanted. . . . Bewilderment had 
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simply gone or at any rate was going fast” (WMK 260). Maisie 
seemingly discovers at this point that Sir Claude is “what she 
wanted.” However, the declaration “I love Sir Claude” is made, 
firstly, “with a sense slightly rueful and embarrassed that she 
appeared to offer it as something that would do as well” as 
claiming to love Mrs. Beale and, secondly, as “an answer to [Sir 
Claude’s] pats” (262). The statement “I love Sir Claude” is a 
response to the demands of the adults around her, not an 
articulation of her vision at this “great moment.” If knowing 
what she wants has “helped the child,” it has helped her toward 
a clearer vision of herself, but that vision is concealed, not 
expressed, by her words about Sir Claude.  
     This “great moment” is thus anticipated by the “moral 
revolution” she experiences much earlier in the text: knowing, 
finally, what she wants is the culmination of an idea that first 
occurs to her in chapter 2, when “the idea of an inner self, or, 
in other words, of concealment” first occurs to her (13). Just 
as the moral revolution that reveals to Maisie the idea of an 
inner self coincides and is equated with the idea and practice 
of concealment, so the great moment of Maisie’s self-knowledge 
coincides with its concealment from the reader. Maisie’s 
bewilderment may have gone (or, at any rate, be going). The 
reader’s bewilderment remains precisely because what, if 
anything, Maisie has come to know is her inner self, which is, 
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“in other words,” concealment. The culmination of Maisie’s 
knowledge is the culmination of her concealment: Maisie’s vision 
is most complete when it is least articulated. 
     Carren Kaston suggests that “what we finally see in the 
novel is Maisie’s escape from alien ‘fictions’ or versions of 
her experience, from the prologue’s neutralisation of her 
predicament, from the custodial hands and structures of various 
parents . . . and from the abstract version of her experience 
pressed upon us at times in the preface when James invokes some 
of those same voices and techniques” (30). What we actually see 
is Maisie’s vision of herself not only separated from any of the 
“voices” that have thus far attempted to access that self but 
independent of language itself. The narrator suggests that 
Maisie’s vision “of the manner in which she figured” is “a 
phenomenon of perception . . . inscrutable by our rough method” 
(206). The narrator’s rough method--language--is in fact 
antithetical to the self-knowledge Maisie here attains.  
     The narrator’s admission of his incapacity to communicate 
Maisie’s non-lingual knowledge of her own objective reality is 
therefore inevitable, but it also propagates the collapse of his 
capacity to communicate at all. The narrator admits that: 
I so despair of tracing her steps that I must crudely give you 
my word for its being from this time on a picture literally 
present to her. Mrs Wix saw her as a little person knowing so 
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extraordinarily much that . . . what she still didn’t know would 
be ridiculous if it hadn’t been embarrassing. (206) 
The unexpected introduction of Mrs. Wix as the subject, in a 
passage that had seemingly referred to Maisie, marks the 
collapse of linguistic clarity that was anticipated in the 
narrator’s very first intrusion. His earlier attempt to be 
explicit gives way, at this stage, to despair.  
     However, the mention of Mrs. Wix does more than suggest 
“the difficulties of the narrator” in his attempt to “follow and 
understand” Maisie (Phillips 106). It also introduces the 
crucial question of Maisie’s knowledge not only of her own self 
but of adult selfhood. The obscurity demands that the reader ask 
whether the “her” in the first of these sentences is Maisie or 
Mrs. Wix and, by extension, whether Maisie’s remarkable vision 
is of the manner in which “she” (Maisie) figures to herself or 
of the manner in which “she” (Mrs. Wix) figures to Maisie. It is 
precisely the impossibility of establishing which that enables 
Maisie’s vision to be potentially either and potentially both.  
     Steedman argues that the nineteenth century belief in “a 
wholeness in interiority, that will figure itself forth, from 
inside to outside” finds its “location in the child”: the child 
is the expression of “the impulse to personify ideas of the 
[adult] self” and enables personification of the “wholeness” of 
that self (15, 1). The obscurity of the narrator’s language here 
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allows for the possibility that Maisie’s remarkable vision is of 
the “wholeness” of Mrs. Wix. As with her vision of herself, 
however, her vision of Mrs. Wix is most complete when most 
concealed. Mrs. Wix’s interiority therefore only figures forth 
on her presence in Maisie’s inarticulable vision. It is only by 
being inarticulable--and therefore concealed from Mrs. Wix and 
from the reader--that Maisie’s inner world can redeem the adult 
self from the asymptotic disjunction between that self and the 
language – the “I” – through which it can be known.  
     It is, moreover, only as a child that Maisie’s knowledge 
can be outside language. What Maisie knew therefore represents 
that repository described by Kincaid; the mind of the child is 
to be filled with the narrator’s--and, if such explorations as 
“Dollatry,” “A Study of Dolls,” “Children’s Lies,” and Studies 
of Childhood are indicative, the psychologist’s--imagined self-
image, in which language and the self are unified, giving that 
self, consequently, objective reality. The “wholeness” of the 
interior self is figured forth on the mere presence of the 
child, because that presence embodies her imagined, 
inarticulable, and therefore innocent knowledge.  
     However, when Maisie actually speaks she suggests the 
transitory nature of the “Ideal-I.” Maisie’s words anticipate 
her entry into language and adulthood and the consequences of 
this entry for the imagined wholeness of the self, which, as a 
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child, she represents. Indeed, her first words in the novel 
demonstrate this:  
she found the words spoken by her beastly papa to be, after all, 
in her bewildered little ears, from which, at her mother’s 
appeal, they passed, in her clear, shrill voice, straight to her 
little innocent lips. “He said I was to tell you, from him,” she 
faithfully reported, “that you’re a nasty, horrid pig!” (11) 
The moment is, primarily, funny (at least to the reader) because 
of the disjunction between Maisie’s innocent, “faithful” use of 
language and the language itself.  
     This disjunction enacts Bakhtin’s insistence that, rather 
than function as an artistically neutral means of communication, 
“no living word relates to its object in a singular way: between 
the word and its object, between the word and the speaking 
subject, there exists an elastic environment of other, alien 
words about the same object, the same theme” (276). Maisie’s 
language here points to the failure of the speaking subject to 
control the meaning of language in the elastic environment of 
her audience. Between the word “pig” and its object (Ida) and 
between the word “pig” and its speaking subject (Maisie) there 
exists the elastic environment, of which Beale’s words about the 
same object are a part, that undermines the neutral 
communication of Maisie’s intention when obeying her mother. 
Beale’s words, repeated by Maisie and heard by Ida, become 
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meaningless in themselves even as their meaning is comically 
apparent in the environment in which they are spoken.  
     For J. M. Barrie, “[n]o-one ever gets over the first 
unfairness . . . except Peter [Pan]”; if this is “the real 
difference” between Peter Pan and other children, then Maisie, 
like “all the rest,” “will never afterwards be quite the same” 
(150). Rather than conjure up an image of “objective reality,” 
Maisie’s language is illustrative of the social and linguistic 
environment in which she exists. What Barrie calls the 
unfairness of the disjunction between the intention behind and 
the effect of Maisie’s words is the first of many experiences 
that indicate that, unlike Peter Pan, Maisie will never quite be 
the same. Such moments point to the inevitability that, in 
Barrie’s words, “[a]ll children, except one, grow up”: Maisie 
has always imminently, if not already, lost her innocence (69).  
     Indeed, such moments indicate that, outside Neverland, the 
idea of the child’s innocence is necessary because it defers the 
certain corruption it nevertheless represents. The moment when 
the promise of the novel’s title is to be fulfilled expresses 
this contradiction. When, finally, “[t]hey stood confronted, the 
step-parents, still under Maisie’s observation,” the 
“bewilderment” that formerly characterised Maisie’s observations 
has implicitly “gone” or is going, and she, seemingly, sees her 
step-parents with perfect “deep” clarity (WMK 264). Maisie’s 
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repeated insistence, “I know,” is, potentially, a statement of 
this innocent knowledge. Equally, however, that “I know” may be 
an instance, in language, of the same imitative behavior Maisie 
displayed when she “shrieked” at the innocence of her doll. Her 
“I know” may be as knowledgeable, as duplicitous, as the 
language of the adults around her. The clarity and wholeness of 
Maisie’s imagined vision is asserted through her repeated 
declaration that “I know,” but its very articulation inhibits 
the reader’s ability to attain similar clarity. 
     The reader cannot attain the same clarity of vision that 
Maisie seemingly attains in this scene because the only medium 
through which we might be able to access Maisie’s knowledge is 
the very medium, language, that that knowledge has transcended. 
Whatever Maisie knows, the reader cannot know. What, ultimately, 
it means for Maisie to “know” therefore remains ambivalent: 
Maisie’s innocence is sustained as a possibility within the very 
words that simultaneously suggest its corruption.  
     Maisie’s knowledge is therefore in doubt at the end of the 
novel, but it is only thus that it can remain imaginatively 
possible. Poole suggests that “[a] sad way of understanding the 
[past tense of the] title is that Maisie’s knowledge is bound to 
belong to the past. She knew something as a child that she will 
forget as a grown up” (xxii). Although Freud’s discussion of 
infantile amnesia refers particularly to the forgetfulness, in 
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adulthood, of childhood sexual impressions, contemporary 
psychologists shared James’s wider conception of the child’s 
innocent knowledge. That knowledge is not specifically of sex 
but, more essentially, of self. Childhood innocence thus becomes 
the site for selfhood, the loss of which, after Darwin, was 
attributed to the state of adulthood.  
     As Poole’s use of the future tense to refer to what Maisie 
“will” forget in adulthood suggests, however, her adulthood is 
never quite reached. Instead of attaining an articulate 
adulthood, Maisie retains the innocence she embodies as a child. 
Instead of the certain failure of language to articulate the 
objective reality of the self, What Maisie Knew concludes with 
the sustained potential that the child has innocent knowledge of 
that self, to be forgotten in an adulthood that is indefinitely 
deferred.  
     NOTES 
 
     I would like to thank Simon James for his comments on 
earlier drafts of this essay. 
     1Hall is most famous for his 1904 study, Adolescence, which 
“every psychologist studying adolescents today knows,” according 
to Arnett (186). He was a friend of Henry James’s brother, 
William James. See Rosenzweig (esp. 80-117) for a detailed 





recent Ph.D. graduate and adjunct professor of pedagogy at the 
University of Texas. See “Ellis.” 
     2See Shuttleworth for a detailed account of the development 
of Child Study from the mid- to the late-nineteenth century and 
Gurjeva for an overview of Sully’s role in the 
professionalization of Child Study in Britain. 
     3Brontë’s Jane Eyre (1847) and Eliot’s The Mill on the Floss 
(1860) are two of the earliest literary studies of childhood 
mental experience. Hunt provides an outline of the principle 
authors and texts of the first Golden Age of children’s 
literature, within a useful overview of children’s literature 
from the eighteenth century to the present. See Shine and 
Pearson on children in other fiction by James throughout the 
1880s and 1890s. Blackford discusses the correlations between 
and the emergence of Child Study and of experimental literary 
technique in the same period. 
 4 Wardley’s article, which was published after my own had 
gone into production, discusses Maisie’s growth in the context 
of feminist responses to Lamarkian evolution. Its analysis 
suggests that questions of gender and development have a 
complicating significance for my analysis of the child-mind of 
nineteenth-century discourse. With thanks to Susan Griffin for 




     5The question of how to find out what children know, without 
imparting that knowledge to them, is also the central dilemma of 
the governess in James’s “The Turn of the Screw.” 
     6In fact, Maisie is often the pretext for behavior that 
constitutes that problematic knowledge. When, for example, 
Maisie’s presence among her father’s friends invites their 
thinly veiled lewdness, she generates the very knowledge that 
threatens her innocence. 
     7Compare, for example, Wilson’s claim that Maisie ultimately 
offers her virginity to Sir Claude (281) with Leavis’s view that 
Maisie remains “to the end uninterested in, and uncognizant of, 
sex” (130). Such commentary is unified in one respect however: 
Maisie’s innocence has evidently invited adults to think and 
talk about sex not only within the novel but also in criticism 
about it, performing what Ohi describes as a “discourse of child 
endangerment” in which the “compensations of eroticism” are 
perhaps acknowledged more by the adults within the text than by 
some of those writing about it (6).  
     8Banta identifies this as one of the most important scenes 
in the text, a view that is supported by the quantity of 
critical attention the passage has received.  
     9See, for example, Galbraith and, more recently, Sussman.  
 10 The ‘Mr Gradgrind’ Hall refers to is that infamous 




principle that children should be educated in ‘nothing but 
Facts’ (1). 
     11Many critics similarly consider the narrator’s 
relationship with Maisie to be highly problematic; see, for 
example, Klein and Honeyman. 
     12As Teahan suggests, moreover, this breakdown seems to be 
propagated by Maisie’s impending adulthood; the closer Maisie 
comes to a capacity for articulating her knowledge, the further 
that knowledge seems to recede from the possibility of 
articulation. 
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